Does anyone actually believe democracy exists in Afghanistan? If democracy is defined purely in terms of the existence of elections – that is, people vote – then fine. People in Afghanistan do vote. In the most recent presidential elections, incumbent Hamid Karzai faced former Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and defeated him only after less than half of the Afghan population voted, allegations of ballot fraud were ignored, and Abdullah finally withdrew from the race, arguing that a runoff election between himself and Karzai would inevitably be wrought with the same high-levels of fraud that plagued the initial contest. Fraud plus low-levels of participation plus an electoral choice between Karzai and only Karzai equals an illegitimate electoral process, establishing the core component of “shamocracy,” which is non-democracy or ineffective democracy with a “good” democracy sticker pinned on its face by the international community.
The difference between “shamocracy” in Afghanistan and non-democracy in China, for example, is that neither China nor the international community tries to pretend that China is a democracy. Everyone knows it’s not, and the world operates as such. In some countries, such as North Korea, democracy is claimed by the regime while the international community rejects that claim. In Afghanistan, the entire country recognizes the government is a puppet for U.S. and other international interests, yet the rest of the world tries to convince Afghans otherwise. So, democracy in Afghanistan isn’t quite non-democracy in China or North Korea’s totalitarian version of democracy; it’s a unique Humpty Dumpty “shamocracy” based on international collaboration, an omelet made from broken rotten eggs.
In a country where the vast majority of the population is illiterate, poor, and lacks access to quality education, the U.S. and NATO is attempting to put on a charade of democracy. But this is stupid. Afghanistan is electing a republic not a democracy, and the only democratic element in a republic is the notion of accountability, which is absent in a society where the vast majority of the population is, again, illiterate, poor, and lacks access to quality education.
Besides, in reality, no one in Afghanistan voted for the U.S. and NATO invasion. Some Afghans voted for President Hamid Karzai, but few were part of the process that brought him to recognition and power. Since then, Karzai’s government has been mired in corruption charges, and his brother Ahmed Wali Karzai remains attached to drug cartels. Public confidence in the regime is low, and according to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the fourth most corrupt country in the world out of 180 countries surveyed (only Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar, and Somalia are more corrupt). And, after the Afghan elections, U.S. Special Representative Richard Holbrooke and potential Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan (a new, also unelected position) Zalmay Khalizad will likely remain more powerful than the Afghan President anyway.
So what’s the point of this shamocracy? Western interests are sacrificing good governance for hope of democracy, but this is a bad trade-off, especially since Afghans do not actually believe that Karzai represents their interests. So the solution is basic: if the West insists on a shamocracy in Afghanistan, then at least provide the best shamocracy that money and military support can buy. That means, don’t support Karzai, a non-leader that has already proven his ineffectiveness. Instead, support Ashraf Ghani, a leader with domestic and international experience and a proven track record of competency.
Mr. Ghani would be Afghanistan’s Jawaharlal Nehru, a leader focused on integrating local society with modernization and economic integration, the only proven formula for the creation of an economically prosperous state in an area where national identities remained secondary to tribal or local ones. Named the best finance minister in Asia by Emerging Markets in 2003 for his work in Afghanistan and second only to Ban Ki-moon for position of Secretary General of the United Nations in a vote conducted in 2006, there probably is no one more qualified or competent in the world to lead Afghanistan.
A few months ago, I had a conversation with Mr. Ghani about winning the war on drugs in Afghanistan, and his response was illuminating both in its content and context. He argued that the best solution was to employ more women and more people in households in general, thus increasing the overall amount of income in the house above the point at which participation in the drug trade is attractive (this is in addition to interdiction and alternative development initiatives – the proposal currently accepted by the Obama administration).
Is there a better response more consistent with South Asia's, the U.S and NATO's, or even the world’s interests than the above to the drug problem? Is there any response more consistent with the creation of a non-extremist, free-market, and participatory democracy than that? There is no better option than Mr. Ghani, and there is no shame in recognizing that.
Democracy is not a good in and of itself all of the time. China’s rapid development since 1978 and Singapore’s over the past several decades has been at the expense of democracy, and Adolf Hitler in Germany was elected by a democracy. The process of “democratizing” Iraq led to a civil war and imposing democracy on the Gaza Strip led to the election of Hamas. The veneer of democracy in North Korea and Uzbekistan give Kim Jong Il and Islam Karimov respectively mechanisms through which they can lie to their own constituencies about the legitimacy of their leadership.
This doesn’t mean democracy is always bad either. Afghans deserve democracy just like any human being around the world deserves a say in the direction of their own lives. But democracy isn’t easy; it takes social preparation and the belief in the competency and legitimacy of the state. Before democracy can exist in Afghanistan, Afghans need to believe in the virtue of having an Afghanistan. Before building a democratic nation, a national identity must first exist. To entrench a national identity, the state must justify its own existence through the provision of public services: the notion of “Afghanistan” must make the people’s lives better, not worse. This requires a technocrat, not a corrupt bureaucrat. Thus, it requires Mr. Ghani and not Mr. Karzai.
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